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What determines the speed of the technology diﬀusion? What are the consequences of
diﬀusion? This paper presents a model to address these questions. Skilled machine-users adopt
a new technology ﬁrst, while unskilled users wait until machines become more reliable and
accessible. The quality improvement of machines is the engine of diﬀusion, and it is carried
out by the machine producer. The speed of diﬀusion is aﬀected by the skill distribution in the
economy. At any point in time, the machine producer can start producing a new generation of
machines. The timing of this event is inﬂuenced by the skill distribution.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
New technologies are the engines of economic growth. Since the pioneering work of Abramovitz
(1956) and Solow (1957), many researchers have found that technological progress is essential in
growth process.1 Recent studies on international income diﬀerences suggest that a large part of
income variation is explained by the diﬀerences in technology employed in each country.2
It takes time for a new technology to acquire economic signiﬁcance. First, it has to be brought
into the economy (innovation). Then, it is gradually adopted by many people (diﬀusion). The
last decade has witnessed a large development in the economics of innovation. However, not much
attention has been paid to the economics of diﬀusion. Diﬀusion is as important as innovation: no
new technologies have an economic impact until they become widespread in the economy. Diﬀusion
is not a trivial process: in general, diﬀusion takes a long period of time.3 Moreover, in many cases,
innovation and diﬀusion are interrelated. This paper is an attempt to understand the process of
technology diﬀusion.
A common feature of newly invented machines is that initially they are diﬃcult to handle. This
feature leads to a well-known empirical fact: high levels of skill4 are required in the early stage of
technology diﬀusion. To quote Nelson, Peck, and Kalachek (1967),
The early ranks of computer programmers included a high proportion of Ph.D. math-
ematicians; today, high school graduates are being hired. During the early stage of
transistors chemical engineers were required to constantly supervise the vats where
crystals were grown. As processes were perfected, they were replaced by workers with
less education. (pp.144—145. As quoted by Bartel and Lichtenberg 1987)
1Taking the period from 1929 to 1982, Denison (1985, p.30) estimates that 34% of the growth in U.S. real
nonresidential business output (after smoothing business cycles) comes from “the advances in knowledge”. Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995, Table 10.8) summarize some results on other countries.
2See, for example, Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997).
3Mansﬁeld (1968) reports: “Measuring from the date of the ﬁrst successful commercial application, it took twenty
years or more for all the major ﬁrms to install centralized traﬃc control, car retarders, by-product coke ovens, and
continuous annealing” (p.115).
4By skill we mean higher level of ability and education. We especially focus on a speciﬁc aspect of skill: the ability
to cope with new technologies. In a broad sense, it corresponds to what Schultz (1975) called “allocative ability” —
the ability to adjust to the changes in economic conditions. Rogers (1995) summarizes the characteristics of early
adopters of innovations. Among them, it is described that: “early adopters have more years of formal education than
later adopters” and “early adopters are more likely to be literate than later adopters” (p.269).
2This is the ﬁrst key ingredient of our theory. The idea that skill is required for the adoption of a
new technology is also expressed by other economists. In an inﬂuential paper, Nelson and Phelps
(1966) construct models where education enhances adoption. They obtain insightful results such as:
the return to education is higher if the technological progress is faster, and the level of technology
adopted is higher when the level of education is higher. These results are consistent with our model.
However, Nelson and Phelps do not consider the process of technology diﬀusion explicitly. In their
model, the law of motion for adoption is given exogenously, while we make the process of diﬀusion
endogenous.
To investigate the endogenous process of technology diﬀusion, we ask the following question: if
a new technology requires skill, how is it possible that it will eventually be adopted by less-skilled
users? Casual observations suggest that it is due to a change in the nature of the technology.
As the technology matures, machines become more user-friendly so that anyone can handle them.
They also become more reliable. Figure 1 is taken from Rosenberg (1982, p.131). It exhibits the
typical cost of an engine maintenance schedule, together with the particular trajectory for the Pratt
and Whitney JT3D turbojet engine. It shows that maintenance expense drops dramatically in the
ﬁrst several years of engine operation. This reﬂects improvement in the reliability of engines. The
increase in reliability makes the adoption easier for less-skilled adopters. This change in nature of
technology is the second key ingredient of our theory.
How does this change happen? We observe that it is mainly achieved by an eﬀort to improve the
technology by the producers of machines. The producers of a new machine can improve the machine
(improve reliability and user-friendliness) by learning and investing in R&D. This aspect has been
analyzed previously. Stoneman and Ireland (1984) is an early attempt to model the supply side
eﬀect of diﬀusion. They consider a capital good monopolist facing users with diﬀerent threshold
price levels. The production cost falls by learning by doing, and the price of a machine falls over
time. This leads to the diﬀusion of the technology. Unlike our interest in skill and improvement,
their focus is on the price decline, and relating the price decline to the shape of the diﬀusion curve.
In this paper, a model that focuses on supply-demand interaction in the process of technology
diﬀusion is constructed. On the demand side, the skill levels of the users are heterogenous, and
high-skilled users adopt the technology early on. On the supply side, improvement of technology
occurs through the producer’s learning and R&D activity. It makes the adoption by less-skilled
users possible. We also allow a producer to start producing a new generation of machines at any
time.
3Figure 1: Engine Maintenance Expense
Empirical Background: Many recent empirical studies examine the relationship between the
adoption of new technologies and the skill level. Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) show that there is a
positive correlation between skill and new technology adoption. They consider the hypothesis that a
ﬁrm that adopts new technologies demands more skilled workers. To test their hypothesis, they use
the share of skilled workers as the dependent variable and the age of the capital as an independent
variable. In other words, they consider that high skill level is the result of new technology adoption.
We have a diﬀerent causality in mind: a ﬁrm with more skilled workers is more likely to adopt a
new technology.5 A recent study by Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997) suggests that this direction
is more relevant. They conduct two empirical analyses: cross-sectional and time-series. In the
cross-sectional analysis, they ﬁnd a positive correlation between skill level (measured by education
or wage level) and technology use. In the time-series analysis, they did not ﬁnd any change in the
worker characteristics between before and after the adoption of new technologies. They interpret
the result as:
5T h es o u r c eo ft h ed i ﬀerence seems to be the view about which is more ﬁx e d( a n df u n d a m e n t a l )f o raﬁrm; skilled
workers or technology. Bartel and Lichtenberg consider a story where new machines are ﬁxed and they call for skilled
workers, and we view that skilled workers are ﬁxed resources for a ﬁrm and they adopt new machines.
4Attribute 5 (Very Important) 4 3 2 1( N o tI m p o r t a n t ) Mean
Quality/reliability of product 79% 19% 2% 0% 0% 4.8
Ease of use 43% 45% 10% 1% 0% 4.3
Price/performance 48% 37% 13% 1% 0% 4.3
Service/support 43% 44% 11% 1% 1% 4.3
Ease of maintenance 42% 41% 16% 2% 0% 4.2
Purchase price 37% 45% 14% 4% 1% 4.1
Table 1: Importance of Attributes When Evaluating Computers, Computer Boards and Peripherals
Vendors and Products
Our ﬁndings suggest that, at the plant level, the correlation between technology use
and worker wages is primarily due to the fact that plants with high wage workforces
are more likely to adopt new technologies. (p.255)
We follow Doms, Dunne, and Troske and consider skill as a determinant (not a result) of a new
technology adoption. More recently, Caselli and Coleman (2001) analyze the diﬀusion of com-
puters among countries. They show that the human capital level in each country is a signiﬁcant
determinant of computer imports.
We emphasize the importance of a machine’s reliability and ease of use in adoption decision.
Table 1 is taken from Cahners Electronics Group (2000). It is based on a survey of north American
design and development engineers. It shows that the factors such as quality/reliability and ease of
use are more important than price/performance when they evaluate computers, computer boards
and peripherals.
The role of capital goods producers in the process of the technology improvement is empha-
sized by many economic historians. For example, MacLeod (1992) studies mechanical engineering
industry in 19th century Britain and writes “... it was often only through the medium of their
capital-goods suppliers that information about a new technology was passed back and forth among
users” (p.287). In our model, this channel is important since the experience of current users
contributes to the improvement of the technology and beneﬁts future adopters only through the
supplier.
5Recent Literature: The role of the change in the nature of technology during diﬀusion tends
to be ignored in the recent literature. One important exception is Galor and Tsiddon (1997).
They explicitly analyze the eﬀect of the improvement in accessibility of a technology on wage
inequality, intergenerational earnings mobility, and economic growth. They take the improvement
in accessibility as an exogenous process, and consequently do not analyze the mechanism of the
improvement itself. In contrast, in this paper the process of improving a technology, which is an
essential determinant of the technology diﬀusion, is modelled endogenously.
There are several important recent papers that attempt to explain diﬀusion of new technolo-
gies as endogenous process. Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) analyze innovation and diﬀusion of
knowledge. Firms try to acquire better knowledge (technologies) by R&D and learning. Diﬀusion
of new technologies is slow because of informational barriers: it takes time and eﬀort for ﬁrms
to learn new technologies. Technologies are disembodied, and there is no role for capital goods
producers. (In fact, there is no capital in their model.) In our model, the capital goods producer
plays a crucial role in both innovation and diﬀusion. We do not assume any informational barriers,
but lack of skill prevent some people from using a new machine. Chari and Hopenhayn (1991)
construct a vintage human capital model where new and old capital are complementary inputs.
The marginal product of investment depends not only on the vintage of technology but also on the
amount of old capital available for that speciﬁc vintage. Even when new technologies are available,
people invest in old technologies if there exist abundant old capital for these technologies. As a
consequence, diﬀusion of new technologies is slow. We do not assume any complementarity between
old and new capital. In our model, diﬀusion is slow because new machines are diﬃcult to use. Jo-
vanovic and Lach (1989) study diﬀusion of a new technology which is embodied in capital goods.
The vintage-speciﬁc installation cost and production cost fall over time, due to (external) learning
by doing. This leads to a gradual diﬀusion of a new technology. Thus, the diﬀusion is totally due
to the fall of the adoption cost. Their main focus is on the shape of the diﬀusion curve. In their
model, ﬁrms are homogeneous before adoption; in contrast, we emphasize the skill diﬀerence among
machine users.
Since the rate of the technological progress is determined endogenously, this paper is also related
to the literature on endogenous technological progress and growth. The most relevant model is
Young (1993). Young constructs an endogenous growth model with innovation and learning by
doing. In his model, a new product is invented by R&D activity. A new product has high production
cost initially, but it falls as learning by doing occurs. His model focuses on cost decline through
6learning in the consumption goods sector. In contrast, in our model the learning occurs in capital
goods sector, and learning induces an improvement of a technology. His model does not exhibit
gradual diﬀusion: consumers are homogenous and a new product is either purchased by everyone
or not purchased at all.
In our model, machines become more and more accessible by learning and R&D investment.
For learning, we consider a speciﬁc mechanism: learning by using. A statistical model is employed
to derive a learning function (Lemma 1). Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) derived a diﬀerent form of
learning function based on Bayesian theory. They consider a situation where a worker tries to ﬁnd
an unknown target value through trial and error. In contrast, we study a setting where the capital
goods producer learns from the experience of users.
Structure of the Paper: In the next section, a model of technology diﬀusion is constructed.
In Section 3, the dynamics of the model is analyzed through numerical simulations. In Section 4,
the eﬀect of the change in skill distribution is analyzed. In Section 5, some other implications and
possible extensions of the model are discussed. Section 6 concludes.
2M o d e l
Consider a capital good industry, where machines are sold to end-users. The market is monopolized
by one producer. For simplicity, it is assumed that the monopoly lasts forever and there is no entry
into the machine production.
A machine has two dimensions of characteristics: performance and quality. Performance is
the measure of the beneﬁt that one can obtain from using the machine. Machines with higher
performance are, for example, more eﬃcient, more powerful, faster, and so on. Quality corresponds
to the characteristics such as likeliness to break down, ease of use, frequency of maintenance, and
so on. Higher quality machines are more accessible and easier to adopt. In the model, quality
is represented by the error-free rate: if a machine contains many errors, it is called a low-quality
machine. Later, we impose an assumption that a low-quality machine can be operated only by
high-skilled users. As the quality gets better, lower-skilled users become able to adopt it. In this
sense, quality substitutes for the skill of users.6
6Quality improvement in our model can be interpreted as a “skill-replacing” technological progress. For discussions
that the technological advances were predominantly skill-replacing in the nineteenth century, see Acemoglu (2002)
and Goldin and Katz (1998).
7Performance is denoted by bi ∈ R++,w h e r ei is the index of the generation of the technology.
When the generation-i technology is born, the value of bi is determined. bi does not change over
the life cycle of technology i. It is always the case that bi ≥ bi−1 for all i. Quality is represented by
the error ratio, θi ∈ [0,1]. It represents the amount of “bugs” in a generation-i machine. Smaller
θi implies higher quality. θi is improved over time as technology i matures. (Thus, θi is inversely
related to the quality. We can view (1 − θi) as the actual measure of the quality.) It is possible
that θi−1 <θ i (an older technology has higher quality), especially when i is just introduced.7
Thus, there is a possibility of a trade-oﬀ between performance and quality. In equilibrium, skilled
users choose to adopt a higher-performance technology despite its low quality, while unskilled users
remain using a lower-performance technology because of its high quality.
2.1 Machine Users
A user of a capital good (machine) is deﬁned as a worker-ﬁrm match. Each worker has an exoge-
nously given skill level s. This is going to be a key factor in the technology adoption decision. The
machine user produces a consumption good. The only input for the consumption good production
is a machine (and its operator). The machine depreciates completely in one period. Let bi be the
amount of surplus generated by hiring one generation-i machine.
Imagine that, when introduced, a machine contains “bugs” when performing some of its tasks.
Let θi be the ratio of the tasks that contain bugs in a generation-i machine. The error rate, θi,
declines over time as bugs are corrected. This process is called a quality improvement. Assume that
high-skilled users are more tolerant of the errors. Low-skilled users and high-skilled users are hit
by an error with the same probability, but high-skilled users can deal with the bugs better. They
are able to solve the technical problems and ﬁx the bugs more easily.8 The proﬁto fau s e rf r o m
7Mansﬁeld (1968) states: “Learning takes place among the producers of innovation, as well as the users. Early
versions of an innovation often have serious technological problems, and it takes time to work out these bugs. During
the early stages of the diﬀusion process, the improvements in the new process or product may be almost as important
as the new idea itself” (pp.112—113).
8Anderson and Davidson (1940) describe: “In the ﬁrst stages of such mechanization when machines are somewhat
crude, their operation requires the watchful care of skilled machinists. Likewise, to make those improvements which
increase machine eﬃciency, competent machinists are employed to observe the machines in operation under practical
working conditions. But, as machines increase in importance, they must be further improved in eﬃciency so as to
require little attention and a minimum number of stoppages for repairs or overhauling. This increasing eﬃciency of
the machine itself tends, in the long run, to eliminate much of the work of that large corps of machinists which was
required when machines were ﬁrst installed to displace hand workers” (p.228. As quoted by Goldin and Katz 1998).
8using technology i (i =0 ,1,2,...) is assumed to be
πi(s,bi,θi)=bi − gi(s,θi), (1)
where gi(s,θi) represents the cost of handling errors. The function gi(s,θi) is decreasing in s and
increasing in θi. We consider an extreme case: assume that gi(s,θi) >b i if s<m θ i and gi(s,θi)=0
otherwise, where m>0 is a constant parameter. Then πi(s,bi,θi) ≥ 0 i fa n do n l yi fs ≥ mθi.A
u s e rc a ne a r np o s i t i v ep r o ﬁt if and only if he possesses large enough skill level relative to θi.T h u s
the potential demand for a machine with technology i and error rate θi, when it is priced at pi,i s 9
Di(pi,θi)=
(
0 if pi >b i,
N[1 − F(mθi)] if pi ≤ bi,
(2)
where F(·) is the distribution function of skill. Di(pi,θi) is called potential demand, since all
technologies are subject to the competition with other technologies. Thus, actual demand in
equilibrium can be smaller than Di(pi,θi).
One advantage of this formulation is that we can conceptually distinguish between the quality
improvement of the existing technology (a fall in θi)a n dt h earrival of a new technology (an increase
in bi) in a simple fashion. The current demand speciﬁcation contrasts them in an extreme way: the
quality improvement expands the demand (shifts the demand curve rightward), while an innovation
that improves performance increases the reservation price (shifts the demand curve upward). See
Figure 2. It also allows for the eﬀect of a quality improvement in technology to be separated from
the eﬀect of a decline in machine production cost.10 In the current model, the production cost does
not aﬀect demand as long as the marginal cost is lower than bi.
2.2 Machine Producer
2.2.1 Production
The monopolist can produce the current ith-generation technology and the past (i−1)th one. For
simplicity, the production cost of the machine is set to zero.
9Alternatively, this form of demand can be interpreted as reﬂecting a skill requirement for the use of a machine
with technology i (as θi gets smaller, the machine becomes easier to use).
10As discussed before, the implications of machine production cost changes are already analyzed in the existing



























Figure 2: Potential Demand
2.2.2 Innovation
He can always begin producing newer (i +1 ) th-generation machines, which provide a higher per-
formance, bi+1.W ec a l lt h i ss w i t c hinnovation. Upon innovation, two things happen:
1. The monopolist has to abandon the technologies (i − 1) and older. He is able to maintain
only two production lines, i and (i +1 ) , at the same time.
2. The (i +1 ) th-generation technology starts from the quality of
θi+1 = θi + c(bi+1/bi),
where c(·):[ 1 ,∞) → R+ is increasing and continuous. Quality is lost by upgrading, and
the amount of the lost quality is larger when the producer introduces the higher performance
technology.11
11A more general speciﬁcation is
θi+1 = ν · θi + c(bi+1/bi),
where ν ∈ [0,1].W h e nν<1,t h e r ei sa nincomplete transfer of quality. It turns out that, in the numerical analysis,
the qualitative nature of the model is not altered by the value of ν.
10The ﬁrst assumption reﬂects the capacity constraint in production. It is easy to extend two lines to
more lines, without changing the qualitative nature of the model.12 It ensures that, in equilibrium,
there exist (at most) two kinds of active users: the ones who operate the ith-generation technology
a n dt h eo n e sw h oe m p l o yt h e(i − 1)th-generation technology.
The second assumption bears some similarity to the vintage capital literature (e.g. Zeckhauser
1968 and Parente 1994). A large bi+1/bi implies that the nature of technology i+1is very diﬀerent
from technology i, and the knowledge that the machine producer has accumulated for technology
i cannot be applied to technology i +1. It introduces a trade-oﬀ in the choice of innovation. Even
though higher bi+1 can give a higher unit proﬁt to the monopolist, it increases θi+1 so that the
demand for the (i+1)th-generation technology becomes smaller. The value of θi+1 is restricted to
be less than one. From θi + c(bi+1/bi) ≤ 1, it follows that bi+1 ≤ bic−1(1 − θi).
2.3 Quality Improvement
The technology can be improved over time by learning and R&D investment. Both activities by
the machine producer contribute to the decline in θ.
2.3.1 Quality Improvement-1: Learning by Using
First, consider the process of learning. Here, a speciﬁc form of learning, learning by using,i s
considered. The capital goods producer learns from the experience of users.13 For example, users
may ﬁnd bugs in the machine, which leads to improvement in machine quality. Users may be able
to suggest new applications of the machine. Rosenberg (1982) stated:
... in an economy with complex new technologies, there are essential aspects of learning
that are a function not of the experience involved in producing the product but of its
utilization by the ﬁnal user. ... Perhaps in most general terms, the performance char-
acteristics of a durable capital good often cannot be understood until after prolonged
experience with it. (p.122)
12Alternatively, we can introduce a cost of expanding product lines. Then, capacity is determined endogenously.
13In the literature of economic development, the eﬀect called “learning by exporting” is often discussed to be
important source of technology improvement. Grossman and Helpman (1991) notes that “When local goods are
exported the foreign purchasing agents may suggest ways to improve the manufacturing process ...” (p.166). It is
often argued that “learning by exporting” has been important in Korea’s economic development. See Rhee, Ross-
Larson, and Pursell (1984, Chapter 4).
11In what follows, we will employ a statistical model to formulate the idea of learning by using.14
Learning Process Learning occurs on the side of the machine producer.15 As discussed above,
learning by machine producers is emphasized in many studies in economic history. However, this
aspect has not been formulated in theoretical literature.
Machine producers learn from the users of machines. Each machine can be used for K tasks.
There are Z users who operate machines in each period. Each user employs his machine to carry
out one of these tasks, chosen at random. The operation of J ≤ K tasks are subject to “bugs”.
Thus, a user is hit by an error (ﬁnds an error) with probability J/K.F o rt h ee a s eo fe x p o s i t i o n ,
suppose that the users operate machines in turn. If the ﬁrst user ﬁnds an error, it is reported to
the producer and ﬁxed instantly, and the probability that the second user ﬁnds an error drops to
(J − 1)/K.I f t h e ﬁrst user does not ﬁnd an error, the probability that the second user ﬁnds an
error remains J/K. Then the third user operates the machine, and so on.
The following lemma summarizes the learning process.
Lemma 1 When J, K,a n dZ are large, the expected ratio of remaining errors in a machine, θ0,
follows the law of motion
θ0 = θ · e−z, (3)
where θ = J/K is the initial error ratio and z = Z/K.
14Conceptually, it is important to distinguish between learning by using and conventional learning by doing (Arrow
1962). We consider learning by using as a process of quality improvement through the utilization of the capital good.
In contrast, learning by doing is usually formulated as the decline of production cost induced by the cumulative
experience of production. In many cases the cumulative utilization and the cumulative production of a capital good
move in the same direction (in our model they coincide), and it is diﬃcult to formally diﬀerentiate between them
(unless the capital goods are under-utilized or the capital-labor ratio changes over time). However, the diﬀerence
between quality improvement and cost decline is evident in our speciﬁcation. It will become clear that in equilibrium,
quality improvement (decline of θi) enhances diﬀusion, while cost decline has no impact on diﬀusion (as long as the
cost of production is lower than bi).
15This assumption provides an interesting channel of spillovers. It is possible that skilled and unskilled workers in
our model are producing diﬀerent consumer products (for example, consider the case that the new capital good is a
computer). The experience of a skilled worker may generate a positive spillover for an unskilled worker, if it makes
it easier for the unskilled worker to adopt a new technology. Then, this can be a channel of inter-industry learning
spillover. Stokey (1988) develops a growth model with inter-industry spillovers and writes “... it is important that
learning display spillovers among goods. Otherwise, learning simply reinforces existing patterns of production ...”.
We do not explicitly model the production structure of the goods produced by the users, but an extension along the
lines of Stokey (1988) would give a similar implication.
12Proof. See Appendix.
Notice that z measures the number of users relative to the total number of parts. Although the
above process of error ﬁnding is stochastic, for simplicity we posit a deterministic process for
learning. Following the law of motion (3), we postulate a learning function16
θ0
i = θi · e−µYi, (4)
where µ>0 is the parameter of learning eﬃciency and Yi is the ﬂo wm a c h i n eu s eo ft h eg e n e r a t i o n - i
technology.
2.3.2 Quality Improvement-2: R&D
It is assumed that the quality of a technology can also be improved through R&D investment. That
is, the producer can make its product more user-friendly by “debugging” it. To do so requires a
cost.
We assume that R&D cost is a function of the generation of technology and the amount of
quality improvement. Speciﬁcally, it is assumed to take a form of bi · R(x),w h e r ex is the amount
of quality improvement. The cost is proportional to the performance. The function R(·) relates the
amount of quality improvement to the cost, and satisﬁes that R(·) ≥ 0, R0(·) ≥ 0,a n dR(0) = 0.
16The learning process (4) has two attractive features. First, using one machine for two periods leads to the same
degree of improvement as using two machines for one period. This transpires since (θi · e
−µ) · e
−µ = θi · e
−2µ.T h i s
characteristic is shared by other learning functions listed below. Second, our learning process is comparable to the




i − qi =( 1− e
−µYi) · (1 − qi).
When Yi is exogenous and constant over time, (1−e
−µYi) can be regarded as a constant parameter. This formulation
corresponds to the learning function in Parente (1994). Arrow’s (1962) speciﬁcation amounts to
qi = α1Λ
α2
i ,α 1,α 2 > 0,




 1 +  2Λi
,  1,  2 > 0.
Our formulation can be rewritten as
qi =1− ¯ θi · exp(−µΛi),
where ¯ θi is the initial value of θi. Therefore, our formulation can be viewed as an alternative functional form for
learning process.
13With the current demand structure, the monopolist machine producer cannot sell the generation-
i machine to more than N[1 − F(mθi)] users, and this limits the amount of quality improvement
which comes from learning. Thus, the process of learning is based on the current value of θi,a n di t
can be myopic. In contrast, R&D investment is driven by the future proﬁt from demand expansion.
In other words, R&D investment is based on the future expectation, while learning is based on the
history of past quality improvement. The diﬀerence will be more evident in Section 4, where we
investigate the implication of the skill distribution on the dynamics of the industry.
2.4 Equilibrium
Clearly, given the structure of demand, it is optimal for the monopolist to price pi = bi so that he
can capture all the surplus. With this pricing, he still faces the choice of how many machines of
each generation to sell.
Bellman’s Equation: Denote the monopolist’s value function by V (bi−1,b i,θi−1,θi).T h es t a t e





































The ﬂow net proﬁt of the monopolist from the ith-generation machines, Πi(bi,θi,θ0
i,Y i),i s
Πi(bi,θi,θ0
i,Y i)=bi · Yi | {z }
proﬁt





The ﬂow sales amount accruing from ith-generation machines, Yi, is chosen optimally subject to
Yi ∈ [0,N{1 − F(mθi)}],
14where F(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the skill distribution.
The ﬂow net proﬁtf r o mt h e(i − 1)th-generation machines, Πi−1(bi−1,θi−1,θ0
i−1,Y i),i s
Πi−1(bi−1,θi−1,θ0
i−1,Y i)=bi−1 · Yi−1 | {z }
proﬁt





where Yi−1 =m a x {0,N[1 − F(mθi−1)] − Yi}. This transpires since the potential demand for the
(i−1)th-generation machines is 1−F(mθi−1) and it is always subject to the competition from the
ith-generation machines.
Stationary Formulation: Let the degree of performance enhancement be represented by γi ≡
bi/bi−1. Then, from the homogeneity of the return functions Πi and Πi−1, it follows that V (bi−1,b i,θi−1,θi)=




i). Let the subscripts h and l denote
the higher- and the lower-technology machines that the ﬁrm is currently producing. The stationary
formulation is:


































h,Y h)=γ · Yh | {z }
proﬁt





Yh ∈ [0,N{1 − F(mθh)}],
and
Pl(θl,θ0
l,Y h)=m a x {0,N[1 − F(mθl)] − Yh}
| {z }
proﬁt





To ensure the existence of the value functions, an additional constraint is imposed: γ ≤ ¯ γ,w h e r e
1 < ¯ γ<β −1.
The following proposition obtains:
Proposition 2 Suppose that F(·) is continuous. Then, a unique continuous function v which
satisﬁes the Bellman’s equation exists. v is weakly increasing in the ﬁrst term, and weakly decreasing
in the second and third terms.
15δ σ µ m N ξ β κ ζ
1 1 0.05 80 1 1000 0.8 0.018 3.5
Table 2: Parameter Values
Proof. See Appendix.
This result is intuitive: The value function is increasing in the relative performance of the higher
technology and the quality levels of both technologies.
3 The Dynamics — Numerical Experiment
It is diﬃcult to establish the properties of the model analytically. In this section, the dynamics
of the model are analyzed through numerical simulations. For the skill distribution, a lognormal
distribution is used:
lns ∼ N(δ,σ2).
δ is the scale parameter and σ is the shape parameter of the distribution.
The R&D cost function is speciﬁed as follows:
R(θe−µY − θ0)=ξ · (θe−µY − θ0)2,
where ξ>0 is a parameter. R&D cost is zero when θ0 = θe−µY ; in that case only “learning by
using” takes place. For the loss of quality with innovation, let
c(γ)=κ + ζ(γ − 1)2,
where κ ≥ 0 and ζ>0 are parameters.
Table 2 shows the values of the parameter used for the experiment. Standard value function
iteration method is used for the computation. A simple grid search method is utilized (since the
problem is not necessarily concave, a method which involves diﬀerentiation is hard to use) and
linear interpolation is employed when necessary.17 Initial values are given as θ1 =0 .01, θ2 =0 .05,
and γ =1 .05.
It turns out that in the experiments below, it is optimal for the monopolist to set Yh =1−
F(mθh), that is, to sell the higher-technology machine as many users as possible at any time. This is
17Interpolation is needed to compute the value along the “innovate” branch. Better interpolation methods, e.g.

















Figure 3: Diﬀusion Curves
intuitive for three reasons. First, since ∂Ph/∂Yh = γ and ∂Pl/∂Yl =1 , higher-technology machines
give higher (static) marginal proﬁt to the producer. Second, since ∂
¡
θe−µY ¢
/∂Y = −µθe−µY ,
keeping Y constant, the contribution of Y to learning is larger when θ is larger. Since it is always
t h ec a s et h a tθh ≥ θl,l e a r n i n ge ﬃciency is higher in the production line of the higher-technology








h, but not θ0
l. This gives an additional incentive to make θh smaller.
The next two sections show the dynamics of technology diﬀusion and adoption in the model.
First, we focus on the process of diﬀusion itself. Second, adoption timings of the users with diﬀerent
skills are described.
3.1 Time Series for Technology Diﬀusion and Innovation
Figure 3 shows the time series for technology diﬀusion. The four curves represent the potential
demand Di(pi,θi) for the four technologies. The price pi is constant at bi (see Section 2.4), but
18It is also true that µθe
−µY is decreasing in Y , so this intuition goes the opposite direction when Yh ≥ Yl.
However, µθe
−µY is bounded below by µθ for the change in Y , and thus learning eﬃciency is higher in high-tech if
µθhe
−µYh ≥ µθl holds. This appears to hold almost always, since θl is always very close to zero.
17Figure 4: Diﬀusion Curves: Another Look
Di(pi,θi) increases over time since θi declines. The diﬀusion curves typically exhibit an S-shape,
which is observed in many empirical literature of technology diﬀusion.19 Figure 4 provides another
look at the diﬀusion curves. It shows what fraction of the users use each technology in each period.
Since high-skilled users adopt a new technology ﬁrst, we can consider that the highest-skilled user
is at the bottom and the lowest-skilled user is at the top of the ﬁgure. By reading the ﬁgure
h o r i z o n t a l l y ,w ec a ns e eh o wau s e ra te a c hp e r c e n t ile of skill distribution changes his technology
over time. Figure 5 shows the dynamics of the error ratio, θ. They fall almost at a constant speed.
The S-diﬀusion curves then follow from the shape of the cumulative distribution function for the
lognormal skill distribution.
An innovation occurs when θh becomes nearly zero, that is, when the best-practice machine
has diﬀused to nearly everyone. This transpires since the cost of innovation is lower when θh is
small. The cost of bringing the (i+1)th generation technology on line is twofold. First, the lower-
technology machine switches from the (i − 1)th generation to ith generation. This implies that
the quality of the lower technology changes from θi−1 to θi. Usually this entails a deterioration in
quality, since most of the time θi−1 ≤ θi holds. If θi (which is θh before the innovation) is nearly
















Figure 5: Error Ratio
zero, this cost is also very small. Second, the error ratio of the higher-technology machine increases
by c(γ).T h a ti s ,θi+1 = θi + c(γ). This deterioration in quality entails a loss of demand. The cost
of this change (the loss of demand) depends on how many users are in between the skill levels mθi
and m[θi + c(γ)]. Since our skill distribution is lognormal, f(mθi) is increasing in θi when θi is
small enough. Consequently, the loss of demand,
R m[θi+c(γ)]
mθi f(x)dx,i ss m a l lw h e nθi is small.
T h ef a c tt h a ti n n o v a t i o no c c u r sw h e nθh ≈ 0 implies that, if θh approaches to zero quickly
(which results in faster diﬀusion), the speed of innovation is also fast. There is a connection
between diﬀusion and the timing of innovation.
3.2 Heterogeneity in Technology Adoption
Figure 6 shows the technology level of machines that the users of each skill level have adopted.20
The skill levels are s =1, 2, 3, and 4 in this example. Higher-skilled users adopt the new technology
earlier. In period 5, for example, the users with skill levels 3 and 4 use the second technology, while
the users with skill levels 1 and 2 use the ﬁrst technology, which has less performance. In period
6, the users with skill level 2 adopt the second technology as its quality improves, while the users

















Figure 6: Technology Adoption
with skill level 1 keeps using the ﬁrst technology.
The diﬀerence in adoption timing and the diﬀerence in technology level are both determined by
the machine producer’s decision about θ and γ.T h ev a l u e so fθ and γ are determined endogenously,
a n dt h e ya r ea ﬀected by the distribution of skills. Through this channel, the other people’s skill
levels aﬀect a user’s own technology level.
One of the criticisms that Jovanovic (1998) made on vintage capital models, such as Arrow
(1962b) and Parente (1994), is that they exhibit unrealistic leapfrogging: in these models, a “pro-
ductivity miracle” and a “productivity disaster” repeat endlessly. The data do not show this type
of leapfrogging at any level of aggregation. Our model passes Jovanovic’s critique; there is no
turnover in productivity distribution among users. To see this, let’s look at Figure 6 again. The
productivity of each user is represented by the height of the graph (the level of adopted technol-
ogy). A low-skilled user adopts a new technology some time after a high-skilled user’s adoption,
and a “productivity catch-up” occurs. However, the low-skilled user’s productivity never exceeds
the high-skilled user’s productivity (therefore, a leapfrogging never happens), since a high-skilled
user always adopts a high-performance technology earlier.
204T h e E ﬀect of Skill Distribution
In this section, the impact of the shape of skill distribution on the dynamics is analyzed. An
implication of the model is that the shape of the skill distribution can have a nontrivial eﬀect on
the dynamics of technology development and diﬀusion. A user’s dynamic path of performance is
not only governed by his own skill level, but also by the economywide distribution of skills.
4.1 Simple Analytical Examples
First, the basic mechanism is illustrated by a series of simple examples. Only one important element
is contained in each model so that analytical procedures can be employed.
4.1.1 Learning and Diﬀusion
The ﬁrst model analyzes the process of learning. Assume that there exists only one technology:
call it technology 1. Technology 1 arrives at time 0. The next generation technology never arrives.
Let the density function f(x) ≡ F0(x) for the skill distribution be uniform:
f(x)=
(
1/σ for x ∈ [δ − σ/2,δ+ σ/2],
0 otherwise,
(6)
where δ ∈ (0,1) and σ ∈ (0,2δ). The mean of the distribution is δ, and the variance is σ2/12.
δ shifts the distribution in a parallel fashion, while σ determines the shape of the distribution.
Denote the error ratio of technology 1 by θ and its performance by b. Technology 1 is owned by
the capital goods producer, who learns from the users. The quality improvement of technology 1
(decline of θ)f o l l o w s
θ0 = θ · e−µY , (7)
where Y is the total use of technology 1. The optimal policy for the monopolist is to sell Y =
N[1 − F(mθ)] with the price b. Thus (7) can be rewritten as
θ0 = θ · exp{−µ · N[1 − F(mθ)]}. (8)
Suppose that technology 1 starts from ¯ θ. It is assumed that m¯ θ<δ+ σ/2 (otherwise, the
quality improvement does not start). The following proposition characterizes the relation between
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Proposition 3 Consider two economies A and B with skill distributions FA and FB.F A and FB
have a common δ and two diﬀerent σ’s, σA and σB,w h e r eσA >σ B.F o r g i v e n θ,t h es p e e do f
quality improvement, θ/θ0, is larger in economy A if and only if θ>δ / m .
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, a more “unequal” economy A experiences a relatively faster diﬀusion initially (when θ is
large), while economy B experiences a faster diﬀusion later on (when θ is small). Figure 7 shows
the equilibrium graphically. When the error ratio is θ, the sales of each economy is proportional
to the shaded area. The area is larger for A i fa n do n l yi ft h ec u t o ﬀ skill level mθ is larger than δ.
Since the amount of learning is a increasing function of the sales, the proposition follows.21
21From (8), the following result is also straightforward: if the skill distribution of economy X ﬁrst-order stochas-
tically dominates the skill distribution of economy Y , the speed of quality improvement is faster in economy X for
given θ.
224.1.2 R&D and Diﬀusion
Here it is assumed that the machine producer can improve quality by R&D investment. Again,
we consider the diﬀusion of a single technology, with the same notation as the previous section.
The skill distribution is given by (6). Machine production is monopolized perpetually. There is no
learning, but the monopolist can improve the quality of machines by R&D investment. He chooses
the new quality (1 − θ0) of the technology (where θ0 ≤ θ) subject to the R&D cost function
R(θ − θ0)=ξ · (θ − θ0)2.
Clearly the optimal sales policy for the monopolist is to sell N[1 − F(mθ)] with the price b,
which yields the proﬁto fN[1−F(mθ)]·b. Then the only decision for him is the choice of θ0.S i n c e
it is not beneﬁcial to set θ<θ≡ δ − σ/2, it is innocuous to impose a constraint θ0 ≥ θ. Suppose
that the initial value of ¯ θ satisﬁes ¯ θ ≤ δ + σ/2.
The monopolist’s Bellman’s equation is
v(θ)= m a x
θ≤θ0≤θ
{N[1 − F(mθ)] · b − ξ(θ − θ0)2 + βv(θ0)}.





+2 ξ(θ0 − θ00)
¸
| {z }
marginal beneﬁto fr e d u c i n gθ0
− 2ξ(θ − θ0)
| {z }
marginal cost
− λ =0 , (9)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint θ0 ≥ θ. With the initial condition ¯ θ
and the transversality condition limt→∞ βtλt =0 , the unique solution of this second-order diﬀerence
equation is (θt refers to the value of θ at period t):
θt =
(






governs the speed of quality improvement. The speed of quality improvement is higher when b,
m, N,a n d1/σ are larger, since these raise the marginal beneﬁt from quality improvement. The


























24parameter, ξ,s l o w st h ed i ﬀusion. A notable result is that the speed of quality improvement, φ,i s
decreasing in σ. In an “unequal” economy, the speed of quality improvement due to R&D is slower.
Figure 8 shows the equilibrium. The area of shaded region is proportional to the direct beneﬁt
from R&D, which is the ﬁrst term in the square bracket in (9). This area represents the amount
of (additional) demand that can be captured by the quality improvement. The area is larger if
the density of the skill distribution is “thick”: in the case of uniform distribution, the area is
proportional to 1/σ. Thus, the incentive for quality improvement is larger when σ is smaller.
4.1.3 Size of Innovation
The third model focuses on the decision to innovate. Assume that the skill distribution is given by
(6), but δ − σ/2 ≤ 0. Here, quality improvement is exogenous: θt = ρt · ¯ θ, where ρ ∈ (0,1).L e t
m¯ θ ≤ δ + σ/2 so that the demand for the machines is











The monopolist can choose the level of the machine performance, γ, when he innovates. It is
assumed that if he chooses a higher γ, then initial quality is lower. Thus,
¯ θ = c(γ),w h e r ec0(·) > 0.
This imposes a trade-oﬀ: if the monopolist chooses a revolutionarily high-performance technology,
he can sell it at a high price (price equals γ) but demand is going to be low because of the low
quality. A low-performance technology would sell to many, but the proﬁtp e rm a c h i n ei ss m a l l .























































1 − βρ | {z }
marginal cost
=0 . (10)
25The next proposition follows.22
Proposition 4 Optimal performance γ is increasing in σ.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since γ is increasing in σ, ¯ θ is also increasing in σ. In an “unequal” economy, innovation is more
drastic, and the initial quality of machines is low when introduced.
4.2 Numerical Simulation
Next, the full model is analyzed numerically. The main focus is the eﬀect of the change of the
shape parameter σ.
4.2.1 Diﬀusion and the Distribution of Skills
Figure 9 compares the diﬀusion of a technology with diﬀerent values for σ. The other parameter
values are the same as in Table 1. Three cases are displayed: σ =0 .8, σ =1 .0, and σ =1 .2.I tc a n
be seen that the diﬀusion is faster with a small σ. The diﬀusion curves start from almost the same
level of adoption (about 40%), but it takes 5 periods when σ =0 .8,6p e r i o d sw h e nσ =1 .0,a n d
almost 8 periods when σ =1 .2 to diﬀuse to 70% of users.
Two eﬀects are working. First, as we saw in Section 4.1.2, the incentive for R&D is larger when
the skill distribution is less dispersed. R&D investment in ﬁrst 6 periods23 is 0.085 for σ =0 .8,
0.081 for σ =1 .0, and 0.068 for σ =1 .2. This leads to faster diﬀusion for smaller σ. Second, as in
Section 4.1.1, learning is faster in the beginning the larger σ is, but it favors the smaller σ later.
This second eﬀect can be seen in the ﬁgure from the fact that in the ﬁrst few periods, the speed
of diﬀusion is almost the same for all the distributions. The combination of these two yields the









H[m · ρt · c(γ)]





where H(x)=f(x)/[1−F(x)] is the hazard function. Thus, the optimal choice of γ is closely related to the property
of H(x). An important fact here is that H(x) is decreasing in σ for the uniform distribution employed in this section.
This property holds for the lognormal distributi o nu s e di nt h en u m e r i c a le x p e r i m e n t s ,w h e nx is not too small (see
Hastings 1975, p.87).
23The R&D investment in later periods do not contribute much to the diﬀusion of current technology. (It is rather
for the next upcoming technology, since the next technology starts from the quality level θh + c(γ).) So we do not



















Figure 9: Diﬀusion Curves
overall faster diﬀusion for smaller σ. This is consistent with the empirical works cited in Oi (1997):
a homogenous society exhibits faster diﬀusion.
4.2.2 Innovation and Growth
The innovation decision is also aﬀected by the shape parameter σ. There are two decisions to make:
when to innovate and how much to innovate. Figures 10 and 11 show that there is a systematic
relationship between σ and the innovation decision. As σ increases, the degree of performance
enhancement, γ, becomes larger. This is consistent with the analytical result in Section 4.1.3. It
reﬂects the fact that when σ is large, the marginal loss from larger θ (low quality) is smaller (relative
to the marginal gain). The periods between innovations become longer as σ gets larger. As is seen
in Section 3.1, innovation occurs when θh ≈ 0.I na ne c o n o m yw i t hl a r g eσ, it takes time for θh to
become near zero.24
In a stationary equilibrium, the rate of growth in machine performance for each user is dictated
by γ and the interval between innovation (denote it by T). In fact, the average rate of growth is
24This is due to two eﬀects. First, a larger θh (due to a larger γ) in each innovation implies that it takes time to
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Figure 12: Average Growth Rate
common among the active users and given by g =( l o gγ)/T. Figure 12 plots the change in average
growth rate g as σ changes from 0.4 to 1.4. There is a non-monotonicity, as the eﬀects of γ and
T oﬀset each other. When σ is very low, the innovations are too incremental. On the other hand,
when σ is very high, even though each innovations are revolutionary, the time intervals between
innovations are too long.
5 Other Implications
5.1 General Equilibrium
Our analysis has been in a partial equilibrium framework. Extending it to a general equilibrium
model would complicate the analysis, but it maintains the interesting features.
To illustrate, consider a simpler model where there are only two skill levels. The skilled workers
(H) can engage in R&D (for quality improvement) in the capital goods sector (HR)o rw o r ka s
machine users (HU) in the consumption goods sector. All the unskilled workers (L) become machine
29users (LU). The resource constraint is
HR + HU = H, (11)
and
LU = L. (12)
Suppose that the supply of unskilled labor (L) increased suddenly. From (12) LU increases, so
keeping HU constant, the relative amount of unskilled users of machine increases. Thus it would
be more beneﬁcial for capital good producers to improve the quality of machines. This increases
HR, and from (11), it reduces HU. Then, the relative amount of unskilled users increases further.
The general equilibrium eﬀect makes quality improvement even faster.
Another interesting implication would arise when we consider multiple industries. Industries
may vary in their timing of innovation. Since skill is rewarded the most in those industries which
have just experienced innovation, skilled workers tend to be allocated to those industries and would
move out of them as the technologies mature. It adds another dynamic aspect to the model. If the
size of innovation diﬀers among the industries, the most skilled workers would move to the industry
whose innovation is the most revolutionary. Thus, the skill distribution of potential users in an
industry is aﬀected by the behavior of the other industries.
5.2 Growth and World Income Distribution
Our model applied to the world economy can shed a light on world growth and the evolution of
world income distribution. As is described in Section 3.2, there can be a large diﬀerence in the
timing of new technology adoption due to diﬀerences in skills. It is well known that there is large
diﬀerence in the educational attainment between the advanced countries (the North) and the less
developed countries (the LDCs). Even if the LDCs have an access to new technologies by importing
new machines, they may not adopt them because of the lack of skills. LDCs adopt new technologies
only after they mature and become easier to be handled. The diﬀerence in skills can be a source
of heterogenous technology adoption, and in turn, large TFP diﬀerences.25
25Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) also attempts to explain the diﬀerences in TFP in the world where LDCs have an
access to the same set of technologies as the North. They argue that the technologies tend to be inappropriate for
t h eL D C s ,s i n c et h e ya r et a r g e t e da tt h eu s ei nt h es k i l l - a bundant North and tend to be complement to skills. In our
model, the nature of technology (skill-complementarity) changes over time. In the Acemoglu and Zilibotti model, a
machine that is skill-complementary can never be successfully adopted by unskilled workers, while in our model an
adoption is possible if a suﬃcient amount of quality improvement occurs.
30One interesting aspect of our model is that, even if the Northern countries are the only ones who
produce new capital goods and conduct R&D, technological progress and the world growth rate
depend on the skill distribution of the whole world. As we have seen above, diﬀusion and innovation
are interrelated, and the rate of diﬀusion aﬀects the incentive for innovation. It is possible that
increases in educational expenditure in the LDCs not only speed up the rate of diﬀusion but also
drive up the world growth rate.
5.3 Skill Premium
In our model, the demand curve (2) is horizontal. It follows that the monopolist captures all the
surplus and no surplus is left to the users. Then, all users are left with zero surplus, regardless
of their skill levels. This is the result of our simple speciﬁcation. If gi(s,θi) in (1) is speciﬁed





where ψ is a constant parameter. Then a user with skill level s buys the i-generation machine if









This demand curve is downward-sloping. Suppose that the equilibrium price is p∗
i.I fs>ψ θ i/(bi−
p∗
i),t h e nbi − ψθi/s − p∗
i > 0 and the user obtains a positive surplus from using the machine.
Moreover, the surplus is increasing in s. A user with higher skill level enjoys a larger amount of
surplus. We can interpret this diﬀerence in the surplus as skill premium.
Skill premium changes over time. It changes for the users who operate generation-i machines,
as θi and pi changes. The decision of switching to a new technology also aﬀects the skill premium.
The full analysis of the modiﬁed model is substantially complicated, and it is beyond the scope of
this paper.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has presented a theory of technology diﬀusion. We started from two assumptions. First,
high level of skills are required to adopt a new technology. Second, the nature of a new technology
changes over time, so that it becomes more and more accessible to less skilled machine users. This
31change is called a quality improvement, and it is carried out by the learning and R&D investment
of the capital good producer.
We considered a speciﬁc form of learning: learning by using. A learning function is developed in
Lemma 1, and applied to our model. The dynamics of diﬀusion show an S-shape. Since the speed
of quality improvement depends on the skill distribution of the economy, the timing of adoption
by each user is also aﬀected by the distribution of skills. In Section 4, we analyzed the relation
between the skill distribution and diﬀusion.
The machine producer is also allowed to start producing a new generation of machines. It is
called innovation. If he chooses to produce high-performance machines, he has to start from low
quality. Thus the timing and the size of innovation is also inﬂuenced by the skill distribution. In our
numerical experiment, larger dispersion of skill delays innovation, and makes the size of innovation
larger.
This framework is capable of addressing many issues. Some directions were discussed in Section
5. Another interesting extension is to endogenize skill formation. In this paper, the skill distribution
is treated as exogenous. In reality, there is a substantial portion of skill that is the result of
intentional investment.26 On the one hand, as discussed in Section 5.3, the return to skill depends
on the dynamics of innovation and diﬀusion. On the other hand, in Section 4, it has been shown that
skill distribution aﬀects innovation and diﬀusion. With endogenous skill formation, the three factors
—d i ﬀusion, innovation, and skill investment — interact with each other.27 Detailed investigation is
left to future research.
26Schultz (1975) emphasizes the role of education in enhancing the ability of students to perceive new classes of
problems, to clarify such problems, and to learn ways of solving them. See also Welch (1970).
27Redding (1996) constructs a simple endogenous growth model with R&D and human capital investment. New
technologies (as the results of R&D) and human capital are complementary, and he shows that, when there is an
indivisibility in R&D, multiple equilibria can exist.
32Appendix
AP r o o f s
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 : 28
Denote the number of the errors not found before nth user by Jn. Jn is a random variable. By
deﬁnition, J1 = J. Let the (unconditional) expected probability that nth user ﬁnds an error be
πn.C l e a r l yπ1 = J/K. It is also clear that πn = E[Jn]/K,w h e r eE[·] is an expectation operator.
Let the event An = {nth user ﬁnds an error} and Ac
n = {nth user does not ﬁnd an error}.T h e




= E[Jn|An−1] · πn−1 + E[Jn|Ac
n−1] · (1 − πn−1)
=( E[Jn|An−1] − E[Jn|Ac
n−1])πn−1 + E[Jn|Ac
n−1].
Clearly the ﬁrst term is −πn−1 (since one error is found if An−1 happens and no error is found if
Ac
n−1 happens), and the second term is E[Jn−1] (since nothing changes from the past user if the














Consider the situation where J, K,a n dZ are large. Especially, keep θ = J/K and z = Z/K












= θ · e−z.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
Let the right-hand-side of (P1), combined with (5), deﬁne a mapping T.N o t et h a tPh and Pl are
28I thank Shakeeb Khan for helping the development of this lemma.
33bounded and continuous, and the constraint correspondence for θ0
h, θ0
l, Yh,a n dγ0 is compact-valued
and continuous. Then from the standard argument, T deﬁnes a contraction mapping on a space of
bounded and continuous functions and the existence, uniqueness, and continuity of the ﬁxed point
v follows (Stokey and Lucas with Prescott 1989, henceforth SLP, Theorem 4.6). The discounting
part of Blackwell’s suﬃcient condition (SLP Theorem 3.3) is ensured by the assumption β¯ γ<1.
For the increasingness in γ, ﬁr s tn o t et h a ts i n c ePh and Pl are nonnegative, v is also nonnegative.
Then, if v is increasing in γ, Tv is also increasing in γ, since the domain of the choice variables
are not aﬀected by γ. From the Corollary 1 of Theorem 3.2 in SLP, the ﬁxed point of T is also
increasing in γ.
For the decreasingness in θh and θl,p i c k(θh1,θl1) and (θh2,θl2) where θh1 ≥ θh2 and θl1 ≥ θl2.
For each γ, let the optimal choice of (θ0
h,θ0




that v(γ,θh,θl) is decreasing in θh and θl.T h e n w(γ,θ0
h,θ0





h ≡ min{θh2e−µY ∗
h ,θ0∗
h} and ˜ θ
0
l ≡ min{θl2e−µmax{0,1−F(mθl2)−Y ∗
h },θ0∗
























h ,γ0∗) is feasible under (θh2,θl2,γ).T h u s Tv(γ,θh2,θl2) ≥ Tv(γ,θh1,θl1).
From the Corollary 1 of Theorem 3.2 in SLP, the ﬁxed point of T is also decreasing in θh and θl.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
From (4), θ/θ0 is governed by Yi,w h i c h ,i nt h i sc a s e ,i s[(δ +σ/2)−mθ]/σ. It is straightforward
to check that [(δ + σA/2) − mθ]/σA > [(δ + σB/2) − mθ]/σB i fa n do n l yi fθ>δ / m .



















Then the ﬁrst order condition (10) can be rewritten as
Ω(σ) − ∆(γ)=0 .
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